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INTRODUCTION
It has been ten years since the Supreme Court of North Carolina
in Pulliam v. Smith1 took custody away from a father who had been
raising his two sons alone for years, merely because he was involved
* Copyright © 2008 by M. Blake Huffman.
1. 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
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in a committed relationship with another man.2 Although the court
asserted that an individual's homosexuality3 is not a bar to being a
parent,4 the court used activities that define the father as homosexual
against him.' Not only were these activities harmless to the children,6
but the sons were thriving with their father.7 The father was
understandably distraught by the decision: "It seems like the law
doesn't apply to me .... My parenting skills or me as a person never
entered the decision. The fact I was gay made me unfit. I was guilty
before the trial."
8
The effect of Pulliam has been widespread in North Carolina.
Although decided a decade ago, the case is very much alive today. It
has not been overturned and is viewed as the last major gay and
lesbian custody decision in the state, setting precedent that every gay
or lesbian parent in North Carolina must confront.9 Today, as at the
time of the case, many same-sex partners in North Carolina are
raising children."0 Pulliam has likely discouraged many homosexual
parents from raising children in a committed, long-term relationship
2. Id. at 627-28, 501 S.E.2d at 904; Joseph Neff, High Court Alters Custody
Standards, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 31, 1998, at Al.
3. "Homosexual" is used throughout this Comment interchangeably with "gay and
lesbian."
4. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 627, 501 S.E.2d at 904.
5. Id. at 626-27, 501 S.E.2d at 904 (finding the father's private sexual conduct, not
proactively counseling the children against homosexual activity, and allowing the children
to see the couple in bed in non-intimate situations supported a change of custody).
Commentators have criticized the opinion as "anti-gay" from its announcement. See Neff,
supra note 2.
6. See discussion infra Part I.D.
7. Pulliam v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 149, 476 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1996), rev'd, 348
N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998) (noting that the children were progressing, performing
well in school, and participating in sports).
8. Neff, supra note 2.
9. Human Rights Campaign, North Carolina Custody and Visitation Law,
http://www.hrc.org/laws and elections/1131.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (describing
Pulliam v. Smith in the context of providing an overview of the current law in North
Carolina on custody and visitation for gay and lesbian parents).
10. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECON. & STATISTICS
ADMIN., MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000,9 (2003)
(finding that out of the self-identified same-sex partner households in North Carolina as of
the 2000 census, 25.9% of male partner households and 34.7% of female partner
households had at least one child under eighteen years of age). Additionally, the number
of households with same-sex partners increased dramatically in North Carolina during the
time leading up to the Pulliam decision. Human Rights Campaign, Your Community -
North Carolina, http://www.hrc.org/ your community/3041_3076.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2008) (counting 16,198 self-identified households with same-sex partners as of the 2000
census, a 720% increase in same-sex households from 1990 to 2000 in North Carolina, and
noting that "HRC estimates that the Census 2000 figures could undercount gay and
lesbian families by as much as [sixty-two] percent").
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because it forces homosexual parents to choose between their
children and their life partner. The decision has been "interpreted ...
to mean that a homosexual parent can get custody in North Carolina
only if his or her [partner] ... live[s] away from the home where the
children reside."1  Furthermore, Pulliam threw into doubt the
stability of prior custody orders granting custody to the numerous
homosexual parents who did decide to raise children with their
partners.12 Based on the case, if one parent discovers after the
custody order that the other parent is homosexual, a court may find
this fact to be a "material change in circumstances" that would
warrant a modification of custody. 3 This Comment aims to bring
fresh attention to Pulliam and proposes a better standard for
determining child custody in North Carolina when one parent is
homosexual. 4
In child custody cases, North Carolina courts should find that
sexual orientation is not a relevant factor. To this end, Pulliam must
be overruled to establish that gay and lesbian parents are held to the
same standard as heterosexual parents in North Carolina custody
resolutions. Part I of this Comment discusses the facts and holding of
Pulliam. It then introduces the general approaches courts take to the
issue of a parent's homosexuality in custody decisions and determines
that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's approach to the father's
homosexuality in Pulliam was a rejection of the nexus requirement1
and an application of the presumption of harm standard. Part II
discusses why the presumption of harm standard 6 put forward in
Pulliam was problematic from the start and argues that developments
in the ten years subsequent to the decision have further eroded its
11. North Carolina Gay and Lesbian Attorneys, Legal Guide, http://ncgala.org/guide/
guidecust.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
12. Id.
13. Id. ("If one parent is homosexual and wins custody while that fact is not known to
the former spouse and the Court, and subsequently, it becomes known, it may be grounds
for the other party to reopen the case based upon a material change in the
circumstances.").
14. This Comment does not address the appropriate standard for courts to apply
when both parents are homosexual. However, more homosexual couples are raising
children than ever before. See supra note 10. The presumption of harm standard used by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Pulliam is even less logical in its application to a
custody battle between two homosexual parents. If the court finds that both parents are
detrimental to the child based on their sexual orientations, no standard exists to guide the
court. This is another reason for overruling Pulliam.
15. For an explanation of the nexus requirement, see infra notes 53-58 and
accompanying text.
16. For a description of the presumption of harm standard, see infra notes 42-47 and
accompanying text.
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reasoning. Finally, Part III presents a solution consistent with
constitutional law that will eliminate the double standard existing in
North Carolina custody cases. This solution overrules Pulliam to
return North Carolina to a true nexus test and requires specific
evidence of harm to the child from the sexual activity of the parent,
thus reflecting the same standard for all North Carolina parents.
I. PULLIAM V. SMITH AND THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH
CAROLINA'S APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF HARM
STANDARD
A. The Facts and Trial Court Decision
In 1990, Fred Smith's nine-year marriage came to an end after his
wife Carol had an affair and moved in with another man.17 Though at
the time Fred and Carol had two boys, Joey, age eight, and Kenny,
age five, Carol left the two boys with Fred and moved to Kansas with
William Pulliam."5 Fred raised his two sons by himself from 1990 until
1995, a period in which he "realized" he was gay."9 In 1994, Fred's
partner Tim Tipton moved in with Fred and his sons," and Carol
immediately responded by suing in Hendersonsville, North Carolina,
for sole custody of the boys.21 "When asked why she thought the
children would be better off in her custody, ... [Carol] stated that it
was the 'impact of the homosexual thing.' "22
In court, Carol's attorney employed a strategy of graphically
questioning23 both Fred and Tim about their private sex life.2 4 From
17. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 621-22, 501 S.E.2d 898, 900-01 (1998); Neff, supra
note 2.
18. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 621-22, 501 S.E.2d at 900-01. Carol later married Pulliam in
1993. Id. at 622, 501 S.E.2d at 901.
19. See Neff, supra note 2; Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 621, 501 S.E.2d at 901.
20. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 621,501 S.E.2d at 901.
21. Transcript of Record at 33, Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998)
(No. 499PA96); Neff, supra note 2.
22. Pulliam v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 146, 476 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1996), rev'd, 348
N.C. 616 S.E.2d 898 (1998). Fred testified that Carol forced him to tell the two boys that
he was gay. Transcript of Proceedings at 46, Pulliam v. Smith, No. 94 CVD 1249 (N.C.
Dist. Ct. 29th Div. June 30, 1995).
23. It is not the intention of this Comment to sensationalize the facts of this case
through use of strong sexual language. Therefore, the strong language found in this
Comment is quoted directly from the Transcript of Record, Transcript of Proceedings, or
the opinions themselves.
24. The following questions were allowed by the district judge despite testimony that
the door of the bedroom was always locked during these intimate moments:
Do you sleep in your underwear, sir?... How is Mr. Tipton clothed when he
sleeps with you, sir? ... Have you placed your mouth on his penis? ... Has he
[Vol. 87260
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this questioning, the trial court found that Fred and Tim shared a
bedroom across the hall from the boys' bedroom where the couple
engaged in oral sex about once a week." The couple's sexual activity
was confined to the privacy of their bedroom, though they
occasionally held hands and kissed each other on the cheek in the
boys' presence.26 The court found that Tim kept four photos of drag
queens in a box on the top shelf of the couple's bedroom closet, the
couple had at least one party at the home where gay friends were
present, the boys had seen the couple in bed in a non-intimate
context, and Fred and Tim had been to a gay bar at least three
times .2  The trial court also found that Joey cried when he was told
his father was gay.28 Nonetheless, Joey testified that he had no
preference about with whom to live, Tim did not make him nervous,
he liked and felt comfortable around Tim, and he liked Tim's
cooking.29 Additionally, evidence showed that the two boys were
doing well in school, played with kids in their father's neighborhood,
had adequate medical coverage, and that beyond working to support
his sons, Fred went to teacher conferences, helped with the boys'
homework, and helped coach Joey's baseball team.3"
Despite this evidence, the trial court found that Fred Smith's
conduct was improper and would "expose" his two sons "to unfit and
improper influences."3 It also found that this exposure included "a
possibility of... embarrassment and humiliation in public because of
the homosexuality of the Defendant and his relationship with Tim
Tipton, 3 2 and "a burden ... of the social condemnation attached to
such an arrangement, which will inevitably afflict the two children's
placed his mouth on your penis? ... How often have these acts of sexual intimacy
occurred... ? Do you and Mr. Tipton also engage in anal intercourse?
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 22, at 40-44. Fred was also asked if anyone present
during a holiday party in the home had HIV or if Fred knew anyone that had HIV despite
no showing of relevance. Id. at 49, 52.
25. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 32.
26. Id. at 32-33.
27. Id. at 33 ("On at least three.., occasions since first meeting, [the couple has] gone
to an establishment that caters to homosexuals."); Transcript of Proceedings, supra note
22, at 51,142-44. The counsel's questions even prompted presiding judge Deborah Burgin
to start asking questions, for her "own education," about what drag queens are and why
Tim would be interested in them if he was gay. Id. at 149-50.
28. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 623,501 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1998).
29. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 22, at 10, 13. The youngest son Kenny did
not testify. Id.
30. Id. at 12, 56, 59.
31. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 623, 501 S.E.2d at 901-02; see also Pulliam v. Smith, 124 N.C.
App. 144, 146-47,476 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1996), rev'd, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
32. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 34.
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relationships with their peers and with the community at large."33
The court concluded that Fred Smith's sexual orientation would
"likely create emotional difficulties" for the two sons but pointed only
to evidence that Joey cried when Fred revealed that he was gay.34 In
general, the trial court found that the "active homosexuality" of Fred
Smith and "his involvement with Tim Tipton by bringing Tim Tipton
into the home of the two minor children [was] detrimental to the best
interest and welfare of the two minor children."35
Based on these findings, District Court Judge Deborah Burgin
concluded there was a "substantial change of circumstances ...
adversely affecting the two minor children or that will likely or
probably adversely affect ... [them]" and "that it [was] in the minor
children's best interest that [Carol] have exclusive . . . custody."36
Fred was limited to one month of visitation during the summer with
the restrictions that Tim not reside with Fred during these visits and
the couple not perform oral sex while the children were in the home.37
B. Approaches to Considering Homosexuality and Sexual Activity in
Custody Cases
When courts must determine the level of consideration a parent's
homosexuality or sexual activity warrants in custody cases, as the
North Carolina courts did in Pulliam, they generally adopt one of
three methods.38 The first approach, increasingly disfavored,39 is the
per se rule. It requires courts to find all parents in a specific category,
such as homosexuals, "unfit... as a matter of law."4 ° Under this rule,
the court does not compare parents in a custody dispute when one
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The language emphasized is important because it
allowed the court to take custody away from the father without finding actual harm.
Actual harm under the nexus test is the standard this Comment advocates. See infra Part
III.A.
37. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 37.
38. See Eileen P. Huff, Comment, The Children of Homosexual Parents: The Voices
the Courts Have Yet to Hear, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 695, 699 (2001); Julie
Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their
Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 633-35 (1996).
39. See Huff, supra note 38, at 699; Shapiro, supra note 38, at 639.
40. Huff, supra note 38, at 699; see also Shapiro, supra note 38, at 633-34, 637-39
("[A]II parents falling into a particular category... are necessarily considered unfit.").
262 [Vol. 87
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parent is gay or lesbian because that parent's homosexuality is an
automatic disqualification.41
The second approach is the "presumption of harm" standard.42 It
allows courts to presume, even in the absence of evidence, that a gay
or lesbian parent's conduct has a negative effect on the child.43 In
theory, the presumption of harm standard is different from the per se
rule because it "permits, but does not require, a trial court to infer
harm to a child in the absence of any evidence of harm [from a
parent's homosexuality]."" The two approaches are similar in
application, however, because both have the consequence of courts
denying gay and lesbian parents custody based not on harm to the
children, but on sexual orientation of the parents.45
Both the presumption of harm standard and the per se rule
"rest[] on a combination of inaccurate stereotypical images [of gays
and lesbians,] ... unsupported and insupportable assumptions about
the capacity of nonconforming individuals to raise children, and
judicial and societal prejudice and bias."46  Additionally, both
approaches allow courts to speculate about harm.47 The influence of
stereotypes and speculation can become dominant in custody cases
because, although the best interest of the child serves as an
overarching goal, trial courts have a large amount of discretion to
determine the best interest in particular situations.48 In fact, the
41. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 633-34 ("Once a parent's membership in the
undesirable category is determined, no further examination of the case's specific facts
relating to that parent is required.").
42. Lisa A. Brunner, Circumventing the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard: Child
Custody Law in Missouri as Applied to Homosexual Parents, 55 J. Mo. B. 200, 200 (1999),
available at http://www.mobar.org/journal/1999/julaug/brunner.htm.
43. Huff, supra note 38, at 700. One commentator has also named this approach the
"permissible determinative inference." Shapiro, supra note 38, at 634, 639-41.
44. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 634.
An appellate affirmance of a denial of custody establishes that the trial court has
reasonably found facts or has drawn a permissible and properly supported
inference and has reached an acceptable conclusion, but the appellate court does
not necessarily determine that the trial court's decision is the only permissible
inference or the only acceptable conclusion.
Id.
45. Brunner, supra note 42, at 201.
46. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 635.
47. Huff, supra note 38, at 700.
48. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 352, 260 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1979); see also
Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 423, 524 S.E.2d 95, 97 (2000) ("In cases involving
child custody, the trial court is vested with broad discretion."). "In cases involving custody
of children, the trial judge, who has the opportunity to see and hear the parties and the
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North Carolina legislature has provided little statutory guidance for
trial courts on what should be considered in determining the best
interest of the child.49 While some states have statutes that list factors
to consider in custody determinations," North Carolina provides no
factors and, additionally, there are no presumptions applicable in
custody cases in North Carolina.51 Because of this wide discretion,
courts sometimes explore issues completely irrelevant to the best
interest of the child, such as a parent's sexual orientation.52
The final approach to determining the level of consideration a
parent's homosexuality or sexual activity warrants is the "nexus test,"
which is designed to combat the use of stereotypes and speculation
dominant in the other approaches. This approach requires courts to
find that a parent's homosexuality or sexual activity has an effect on
the child before that homosexuality or sexual activity is even
considered at all in the custody determination.53 Because of the nexus
test's "effect requirement," a parent's homosexuality would not
automatically result in a denial of custody.54 The nexus test mandates
that courts compare the two parents and evaluate "the significance of
specific characteristics or conduct ... on an individual case-by-case
basis."55 Furthermore, a pure nexus test will not allow the influence
of stereotypes and speculation.56 For the nexus test to eradicate those
influences, real harm to the children, not speculation of harm, must
be required before a change in custody is allowed. Loosening the
effect requirement destroys the requirement's purpose entirely. If a
judge is permitted to freely "speculate about possible harm, she or he
can avoid the requirement that a link between conduct and harm be
demonstrated."57 Thus, under the nexus test, evidence in the record
witnesses, is vested with broad discretion." In re Custody of Williamson, 32 N.C. App.
616, 620, 233 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1977) (citations omitted).
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (2007) (providing only that a showing of "changed
circumstances" is needed to modify a custody order).
50. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137
(2007).
51. 3 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 13.8 (5th ed.
2002).
52. See, e.g., Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416,423,256 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1979).
53. Huff, supra note 38, at 699; Shapiro, supra note 38, at 633 ("This approach is
denominated a nexus test because it turns on the court finding a nexus between the
characteristic or conduct at issue and the parenting abilities of the mother or father.").
54. Huff, supra note 38, at 701.
55. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 633, 636 (recognizing that the test "does not dictate any
particular result in all cases").
56. See, e.g., Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 377-78, 451 S.E.2d 320, 324-25
(1994).
57. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 642.
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of actual effect-real harm-must be found to support a change in
custody. "[E]vidence of 'speculation or conjecture that a detrimental
change may take place sometime in the future' will not support a
change in custody., 58 Therefore, of the three approaches, the nexus
test is the only one that will require courts to find evidence of effect
on a child before changing custody. This is desirable because without
the effect requirement, courts have wide discretion to venture into
areas not relevant to the best interest of the child.
C. The Approach North Carolina Courts Purport to Follow: The
Nexus Test
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has claimed, before and
after Pulliam, to follow the nexus test.59 In the context of custody
modification, North Carolina's avowed standard is a two-prong test
requiring: (1) "a substantial change of circumstances [since the last
order] affecting the welfare of the child;"6 and (2) that a modification
is in the child's best interest. 61 As stated, this standard is a nexus test
because "the moving party must prove .. , a 'nexus' between the
changed circumstances and the welfare of the child. '62 The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina has even gone so far as to define "changed
circumstances" as "such a change as affects the welfare of the child.
'63
Under this standard, the moving party has the burden of satisfying the
first prong-that a substantial change in circumstances has affected
the child.' If the moving party fails to meet this burden of showing
58. Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000) (quoting
Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 599, 331 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1985)); see also Benedict, 117
N.C. App. at 377, 451 S.E.2d at 324 ("While it is well established that the trial judge is in
the best position to observe the parties and witnesses and to hear the evidence, 'it is not
sufficient that there may be evidence in the record sufficient to support findings that could
have been made.' " (quoting Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 355, 399 S.E.2d 399, 402
(1991) (emphasis added))).
59. See Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471,474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003); Blackley v.
Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974).
60. Blackley, 285 N.C. at 362, 204 S.E.2d at 681; see Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586
S.E.2d at 255 ("[B]efore a child custody order may be modified, the evidence must
demonstrate a connection between the substantial change in circumstances and the
welfare of the child. ); Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 424, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98
(2000); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (2007) (requiring a showing of changed
circumstances for modification of child custody orders).
61. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253.
62. Id. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255-56; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.103
(describing the North Carolina standard as a nexus test).
63. Benedict, 117 N.C. App. at 375, 451 S.E.2d at 323 (quoting In re Harrell, 11 N.C.
App. 351, 354, 181 S.E.2d 188, 189 (1971)).
64. Id. (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 636, 335 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1985)).
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effect on the child, the analysis should end and custody should not be
modified.65
The sexual activity of the parents may be an alleged basis for
custody modification. 6  Frequently in these cases, a party is able to
satisfy the initial burden of showing a substantial change in
circumstances by providing evidence of the other parent's sexual
activity, but the party fails to demonstrate that the change affects the
child.67 Showing this effect is necessary because North Carolina
courts profess to follow the nexus test, and North Carolina has no
presumption that a child is harmed by the sexual activity of the
parents.68 When homosexuality forms the basis for a party's motion
to change custody, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has stated
that it should be regarded as a "discrete set of circumstances ...
[without] ... self-evident ... [effects on the child, and therefore, the
moving party must show] evidence directly linking the change to the
welfare of the child., 69  Thus, as outlined, the North Carolina
standard for modification of custody is characteristic of a nexus test:
it contains an element requiring the moving party to show effect on
the child;71 it has no presumption that the sexual activity of parents
harms the child;71 and the supreme court has explicitly stated that an
alleged change in homosexuality requires evidence connecting the
change to an effect on the child.72 Regrettably, this nexus test was not
the test the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied in Pulliam.
65. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253 ("If the trial court concludes either
that a substantial change has not occurred or that a substantial change did occur but that it
did not affect the minor child's welfare, the court's examination ends, and no modification
can be ordered."); see Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 139, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000);
see also Browning, 136 N.C. App. at 425, 524 S.E.2d at 99 (specifying that the trial court
was not "empowered to reopen the custody issue and determine what was in the best
interest of the children").
66. See, e.g., Browning, 136 N.C. App. at 424, 524 S.E.2d at 98 (finding the mother was
arguing for a change in custody based on her former husband's cohabitation with his
girlfriend).
67. Id. at 424-25, 524 S.E.2d at 98-99 (finding no evidence that the father's
cohabitation with his girlfriend affected the child).
68. Id. at 425, 524 S.E.2d at 99 ("It is the effect on the children upon which the trial
court must focus in determining whether to modify custody."); see also REYNOLDS, supra
note 51, § 13.49.
69. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 256. For a discussion of Shipman, see
infra text accompanying notes 196-201.
70. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 375,451 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1994).
71. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.50.
72. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 256.
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D. The Approach Utilized in Pulliam: The Presumption of Harm
Standard
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina correctly applied the
nexus test in Pulliam and found that Fred Smith's homosexual activity
had no effect on his children.73 First, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's decision because it held the trial court's findings to be
either "speculation and conjecture '74 or "nothing more than [an
opinion] ... not supported by evidence in the record. '75 Second, the
court correctly recognized that the evidence actually showed Fred
Smith's children were thriving, and that the conduct of a parent did
not "ipso facto ... [have] a deleterious effect on the children. '76 It
found "no evidence that the defendant's homosexual relationship with
Tipton [had or would] likely have a deleterious effect on the children
or that the defendant was otherwise an unfit parent. '77  In fact,
evidence indicated just the opposite: "[T]he children [were] well
adjusted, attend[ed] school regularly, [made] good grades, and
participate[d] in after school athletics., 78 Finally, the court of appeals
rejected the per se approach to homosexuality and sexual activity:
First of all, a custodial parent that allows his or her same-sex
partner to live in the home will not per se adversely affect the
child. Second, a violation of [North Carolina's Crime Against
Nature statute] in the privacy of one's own bedroom does not
per se adversely affect a child. Finally, a custodial parent who
embraces and kisses his same-sex partner in front of a child will
not per se adversely affect a child.79
Nevertheless, two years later, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reinstated the judgment of the trial court because it found
sufficient evidence supporting a change in custody.8" The court
73. See Vicki Parrott, Note, The Effect on the Child of a Custodial Parent's
Involvement in an Intimate Same-Sex Relationship-North Carolina Adopts the "Nexus
Test" in Pulliam v. Smith, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 131, 151-53 (1996). Following the court
of appeals' decision in 1996, one commentator observed: "The obvious effect [of the
decision] is the adoption of the 'nexus test' approach to determine whether children are
harmed or will likely be harmed by a parent's involvement in an intimate same-sex
relationship." Id.
74. Pulliam v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 148, 476 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1996), rev'd, 348
N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
75. Id. at 148-49, 476 S.E.2d at 449.
76. Id. at 149, 476 S.E.2d at 450.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Parrott, supra note 73, at 153.
80. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 618, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899 (1998), rev'g Pulliam v.
Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 476 S.E.2d 446 (1996).
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applied a standard different from the nexus test-a standard that
undercut the purpose of the nexus test entirely, allowing speculation
and stereotypes to shift focus away from determining what was in the
best interest of the children. According to the nexus test, Carol
Pulliam, as the moving party, had the burden to produce "evidence
directly linking the change [of circumstances] to the welfare of the
child[ren]."81  This effect requirement is the equivalent of showing
harm in this case since a negative change in circumstances is alleged:
a party's motion based on an adverse change requires proof that the
change adversely affects the child. 2 Evidence of such harm "might
consist of assessments of the minor child's mental well-being by a
qualified mental health professional, school records, or testimony
from the child or the parent." 3  The Supreme Court of North
Carolina ignored all such evidence.84
Instead, the supreme court held that the trial court made findings
of adverse effect, citing
activities such as the regular commission of sexual acts in the
home by unmarried people, failing and refusing to counsel the
children against such conduct while acknowledging this conduct
to them, allowing the children to see unmarried persons known
by the children to be sexual partners in bed together, [and]
keeping admittedly improper sexual material in the home."
81. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 478, 586 S.E.2d 250, 255-56 (2003)
(recognizing that a change in sexual orientation "involves a discrete set of circumstances"
that requires this showing).
82. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.103 ("The law [of North Carolina] continues to
require proof of a nexus between the changed circumstances and the child .... If the
moving party has offered evidence of adverse changes, then the party must establish that
the changes adversely affect the child."). The Supreme Court of North Carolina itself
stated in Pulliam that "an adverse effect upon a child as the result of a change in
circumstances... will support a modification of a prior custody order." Pulliam, 348 N.C.
at 620, 501 S.E.2d at 900. The court in Pulliam then goes on to uphold the trial court's
change of custody based on what it viewed as an adverse effect upon the children. Id. at
626-28, 501 S.E.2d at 904.
83. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 256.
84. See generally Pulliam, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (containing no mention of
these factors).
85. Id. at 626-27, 501 S.E.2d at 904; see supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
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Beyond the fact that this "evidence" was hardly uncontroverted,8 6 it is
not evidence of harm as required by a true nexus test. Instead, it was
simply a description of activity of the father and his partner that
identified the two men as homosexual. The focus was not on whether
the activity had any effect on the children. Because of the improper
focus, one is left with the conclusion that the court presumed this
activity was harmful since it did not find evidence of any negative
effect on the two children.
The supreme court also improperly concluded that the children
were experiencing "emotional difficulties" from the fact that Joey
once asked his mother to take him home and asked whether Tim
Tipton was his stepfather.87 First, Carol's actions made it difficult to
determine if Joey's statement was planted by his mother.88 Second,
Joey making such a statement is not evidence of harm. Additionally,
when the court determined that Joey inquired about Tim's status
because he was confused, it was merely a statement of the court's
belief without evidentiary value. Indeed, one may conclude from the
86. No evidence showed that Fred or his partner Tim discussed their sexual activity
with the children, but only that Fred told his sons that he was gay and in a relationship
with Tim. See Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 31. While "in bed together" is
suggestive, no evidence in the record exists that anything sexual was occurring. Id. at 33.
In fact, the room was accessible at the request of the children. Transcript of Proceedings,
supra note 22, at 136-37 (testimony of Tim Tipton). Furthermore, evidence is not clear
that the children even saw the couple in bed. Id. at 42 (showing that when asked if the
children had seen the couple in bed together, Fred stated, "The youngest one probably
has. The oldest one never wakes up before I do."). Additionally, the court improperly
concluded that there was "sexual material" in the home when in reality it was four photos
of men that Tim knew dressed as women and nothing more. Id. at 51. No evidence
indicates the photos had an effect on the children or that they were aware of them. The
photos were not introduced into evidence, and Carol Pulliam's counsel grossly overstated
the photos, saying: "I would characterize [them] as pornography." Id. at 153. Fred
Smith's attorney responded:
There's nothing graphic about the photographs that Mr. Jackson seems so
determined to discuss. Those photographs were not subpoenaed. We had no idea
they were to be an object of discussion today or, as Mr. Tipton said, they certainly
would have been made available to the [c]ourt. They were not subpoenaed
because, Your Honor, there's nothing wrong with those pictures, they're just
simply pictures.
Id. at 158.
87. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 623, 627, 501 S.E.2d at 902, 904.
88. Only after Carol Pulliam told Joey that she "would seek legal counsel to try to get
[the children] out of the home" did Joey tell his stepfather that he wanted his mom to take
him. Transcript of the Proceedings, supra note 22, at 108. Also, William Pulliam, the
stepfather, stated that he did not think homosexuality was "right," further highlighting the
fact that Joey could have been influenced. Id. at 133.
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evidence that Joey simply wanted to clarify Tim's role in Joey's life.89
From the record, it seems that Tim Tipton did play a role equivalent
to one of a stepfather or adopted father.90 Moreover, when Joey
asked that question, Tim responded that he was like a guardian and
that Mr. Pulliam was Joey's stepfather.91 Any "confusion" Joey might
have experienced was quickly resolved.92
The court also relied on speculation to support its finding of
harm. The court used the fact that Joey cried when his father
announced that he was gay to conclude that Joey "may already be
experiencing emotional difficulties" from his father's homosexuality,
and that his brother would "likely ... also experience emotional
difficulties."93 Here, the court itself hedges any claim of harm by
using words such as "likely" or "may,"" emphasizing it could find no
concrete harm. Furthermore, the fact that Joey cried on this single
occasion cannot support the conclusion that he "may already be
experiencing emotional difficulties."95 First, "a finding that the child
'may' be experiencing emotional difficulties is not a finding that the
child is. Moreover, when extramarital sexual conduct between
[heterosexual] persons ... has been in issue, the appellate courts have
required more substantial evidence of harm than one isolated
outburst by a young child."96 Joey's reaction appears to be typical of
a healthy child. His crying fits a normal pattern of behavior: a
negative reaction "to a parent's sexuality.. . tends to take the form of
simple embarrassment, which-given the universality of children
being mortified by their parents at some time or another-is hardly
worth consideration."97 Thus, a one-time isolated crying spell hardly
qualifies as sufficient evidence warranting a change in custody.
89. Id. at 142 (testimony of Tim Tipton) ("He didn't ask me if I was his [stepdad], it
was like does this mean that you're like a stepdad.") (emphasis added).
90. Tim cooked, helped with the children's homework, played ball with the children,
and watched the children when Fred was not home. Id. at 13, 148.
91. Id. at 141.
92. It should also be noted that Joey asked the question "about a week after" his
father told Joey that he was gay. Id. at 142. There was no evidence of "confusion" after
that time.
93. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 623, 501 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1998); Transcript of
Record, supra note 21, at 35.
94. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 35.
95. Id.; see also Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 623, 501 S.E.2d at 902.
96. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.14; see Williford v. Williford, 303 N.C. 178, 179,
277 S.E.2d 515, 515 (1981); Blackley v. Blackey, 285 N.C. 358, 363, 20 S.E.2d 678, 682
(1974); Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 424, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2000).
97. Matt Larsen, Comment, Lawrence v. Texas and Family Law: Gay Parents'
Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 53, 77
(2004) (making a constitutional argument that "[i]nfringing on [the fundamental right to
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Other appellate decisions support the argument that a child's
isolated outburst is insufficient to support a finding of harm. In Ford
v. Wright,9 8 the plaintiff testified in support of the trial court's finding
that her child was experiencing emotional difficulties because the
child cried after witnessing an argument between the parents.99 The
Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that alone a child crying
failed "to provide evidence a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the conclusion that the child had experienced
emotional trauma."1" The court went on to find that this reaction
was normal, and evidence supported the trial court's finding that the
child was "very happy."' 0 ' In contrast, Correll v. Allen"2 presents an
instance where the court of appeals did find adequate evidence of
emotional difficulties that was sufficient, in combination with the
mother's antagonism towards the father visiting the child, to justify a
change in custody.1"3 The emotional difficulties in Correll included
instances where the child: "(1) had difficulty distinguishing the real
from the unreal; (2) felt vulnerable, insecure and helpless; (3) seemed
to have low self-esteem and seemed to be unhappy and fragile; and
(4) had problems with interpersonal relationships. '1"" Joey's reaction
as stated in Pulliam is much more like the child's in Ford than the
child's in Correll: an isolated crying spell that was a typical child's
reaction. Similar to the child in Ford, Joey appeared to be doing well
emotionally, and unlike the child in Correll, Joey was not exhibiting
substantial symptoms of emotional trauma. Therefore, Joey's
isolated crying occurrence does not support a finding of emotional
trauma sufficient to justify a change in custody.
With regards to Fred's younger son, Kenny, the court concluded
that he would likely experience emotional difficulties even though the
supreme court did not find any evidence of emotional difficulties that
pertained to Kenny.105 The court's conclusion with regard to any
repercussions on Kenny is, therefore, nothing more than its
unsupported opinion.
parent] because a child feels awkward about a parent's sexuality would be wildly out of
step with precedent, which has sustained parental rights in the face of much weightier state
arguments about what is in a child's best interests").
98. 170 N.C. App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 456 (2005).
99. Id. at 95, 611 S.E.2d at 460.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).
103. Id. at 469, 380 S.E.2d at 583.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 87, 93.
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The previous analysis presents a court that deviated from the
critical component of the nexus test: the effect requirement. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina claimed it was not holding that the
homosexuality of a parent by itself was enough to deny that parent
custody." 6 This Comment asserts that the homosexuality of a parent
is never enough to deny a parent custody. 10 7 Even setting this issue
aside, the court's holding is inconsistent with its rhetoric because the
majority did remove custody from the father based on evidence of his
homosexuality alone, such as: his living with his partner, his private
sex life, his acknowledgement of his own homosexuality, and other
"improper conduct" by the two men.10 8  The court found as
supportive evidence facts that merely showed that Fred Smith was a
homosexual who conducted himself consistent with his sexual
orientation, not that his actions harmed the children. Justice Webb in
his dissent correctly concluded that finding Fred Smith was "a
practicing homosexual" was insufficient to justify a change in
custody. 0 9 Justice Webb went on to note that "the evidence show[ed]
only that the defendant [was] a practicing homosexual without
showing any harm ... [to] the children by this practice.""11 Without
harm to the children, only the majority's moral opinion about Fred
Smith's sexual orientation is left to justify its reasoning.
Thus, the majority's reasoning marked a departure from the
nexus requirement because it inappropriately presumed harm to the
children solely from Fred Smith's homosexuality."' As a result,
Pulliam "relaxed the 'effect' requirement" when a homosexual parent
is involved."2 This relaxation is a rejection of the fundamentals of the
nexus test and an application of the presumption of harm standard,
signaling a move towards applying the per se rule against all
106. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 627, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1998).
107. See discussion infra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.
108. See Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 627, 501 S.E.2d at 904.
109. Id. at 628, 501 S.E.2d at 905 (Webb, J., dissenting).
[The majority] recites actions by the defendant which the majority considers to be
distasteful, immoral, or even illegal and says this evidence supports findings of fact
which allow a change in custody. There is virtually no showing that these acts by
the defendant have adversely affected the two children. The test should be how
the action affects the children and not whether we approve of it.
Id. at 629, 501 S.E.2d at 905 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58 (describing the nexus test's requirement
of showing effect on the child).
112. See REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.115(b).
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homosexual parents.113 By sanctioning a change in custody without
finding harm to the children, the court allowed speculation of harm
and stereotypes about homosexuality to influence its decision-the
exact troubles the nexus test was designed to combat.114 The
majority's rationale therefore pushed North Carolina into the "many
jurisdictions [using standards] ... called nexus tests, but ... lack[ing]
the substance of a nexus test." ' While it is true that the supreme
court's language rejected a per se rule,1 6 this has little practical
significance because the lower court had already changed custody
from the homosexual father, and there was "no need for a per se
rule."1 7 Even while rejecting a per se rule, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina never applied the nexus test; instead, it affirmed the
judgment of the trial court despite the absence of evidence of harm to
the children.118 For that reason, the court's logic was typical of a
presumption of harm standard because it allowed a court to remove
custody from a homosexual parent based on a presumption that the
children were harmed by the parent's homosexuality. 19 By applying
the presumption of harm standard, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina changed custody based on Fred Smith's sexual orientation
113. See Brunner, supra note 42, at 200 ("[Tlhe 'presumption of harm' approach ...
appears only to be the per se rule in disguise: courts are using stereotypes and speculation
to circumvent the nexus test."); see also Felicia Meyers, Gay Custody and Adoption: An
Unequal Application of the Law, 14 WHITTLER L. REV. 839, 843 (1993) (noting both the
per se rule and presumption of harm approach are characterized by courts using five
justifications to deny homosexual parents custody).
First, courts fear that the child will be harassed. Second, they fear that the child
will become homosexual because he or she is raised by a homosexual parent.
Third, courts believe that the child's morality will be adversely affected by
exposure to homosexuality. Fourth, state sodomy statutes prohibit many forms of
homosexual intimacy and, consequently, homosexuals are engaging in unlawful
behavior. Finally, some courts believe that homosexuals molest their children.
None of the above reasons are factually supported by evidence.
Id.
114. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
115. See Shapiro, supra note 38, at 642.
116. See Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616,623,627, 501 S.E.2d 898, 902,904 (1998) ("This
court [does not] hold that the mere homosexual status of a parent is sufficient, taken
alone, to support denying such parent custody of his or her child or children.").
117. See Shapiro, supra note 38, at 641 (noting that when a lower court has denied
custody to a homosexual parent, the reviewing court is not required to adopt the per se
rule to deny custody, thus making the presumption of harm approach attractive to
appellate courts because it allows the denial of custody to homosexual parents while
avoiding the per se rule).
118. See supra notes 85-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the harm which
the court reasoned the children were suffering.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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without finding evidence that his conduct harmed the children.
Although the court simultaneously denied this was the basis for its
decision,12' unfortunately for Fred Smith, it was the application that
mattered. The Supreme Court of North Carolina did nothing more
than acknowledge the nexus test on its way to applying the
presumption of harm standard.
II. THE PULLIAM PRESUMPTION OF HARM APPROACH:
PROBLEMATIC WHEN DECIDED AND UNDERMINED BY
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Why Pulliam's Presumption of Harm Approach was Problematic
from the Start
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's violation of the nexus
requirement in Pulliam and application of the presumption of harm
standard is harmful and problematic for scores of reasons. This
Comment will briefly provide several of such grounds before
discussing how the approach has become all the more unacceptable in
the last ten years.
One major flaw of the Pulliam approach is that a gay or lesbian
individual who is an outstanding parent, and who indeed may be the
better parent in a custody dispute, may nonetheless be barred from
custody under the presumption of harm approach. As noted earlier,
the second prong of the standard for modifying custody orders in
North Carolina requires a determination that modification is in the
child's best interest.121 The best interest of the child should be "the
paramount consideration in determining the custody and visitation
rights.""12  A judge "must make a comparison between the two
applicants considering all factors that indicate which of the two is
'best-fitted to give the child the home life, care, and supervision that
will be most conducive to its well-being.' "123 If the focus is on the
best interest of a child, it seems that courts should assign custody to
120. See Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 623, 627, 501 S.E.2d at 902, 904.
121. See supra text accompanying note 61.
122. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 375, 451 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1994); see also
Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 139, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000) ("[T]he trial court has
the ultimate responsibility of requiring production of any evidence that may be competent
and relevant on the issue [of the best interest of the child]."); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C.
App. 851, 853, 509 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1998); Paschall v. Paschall, 26 N.C. App. 491, 493, 216
S.E.2d 415, 416 (1975). Neither party has the burden of proof under this second prong.
Regan, 131 N.C. App. at 853, 509 S.E.2d at 454.
123. Evans, 138 N.C. App. at 142, 530 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Griffith v. Griffith, 240
N.C. 271, 275, 81 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1954)).
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the person with superior parenting skills. Yet that is not always the
case because the best interest of the child analysis is noticeably absent
under Pulliam's presumption of harm approach. a4
The presumption of harm approach in Pulliam allowed the
courts to focus exclusively on the private, sexual activity of Fred
Smith when the focus should have been on comparing both parents
using the following relevant factors: "the wishes of the child, the
character and personality traits of the parents, ... the conduct of the
parents,, 125 and the need for stability.'26 The Pulliam courts gave no
weight to the children's wishes and need for stability, in spite of
evidence that the children's best interest could be served with their
father. 127 The courts also failed to adequately analyze the character
and personality of the parents. 128 The presumption of harm approach
124. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (describing the presumption of
harm approach and the room it leaves for stereotypes and prejudice).
125. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.7c (noting that the focus should be on "the
strength of the relationship" between child and parents, and that the environment the
child lives in with the parent is relevant but "generally not as important"); see also In re
Custody of Williamson, 32 N.C. App. 616, 620-21, 233 S.E.2d 677, 680-81 (1977)
("Although not controlling, the wishes of a child who has reached the age of discretion are
entitled to consideration in awarding custody 'because the consideration of such wishes
will aid the court in making a custodial decree which is for the best interests and welfare of
the child.'" (quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 631, 184 S.E.2d 417, 420
(1971))).
126. Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975) (quoting Shepard v.
Shepard, 273 N.C. 71, 75, 159 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1968)).
A decree of custody is entitled to such stability as would end the vicious litigation
so often accompanying such contests, unless it be found that some change of
circumstances has occurred affecting the welfare of the child so as to require
modification of the order. To hold otherwise would invite constant litigation ....
This in itself would destroy the paramount aim of the court, that is, that the
welfare of the child be promoted and subserved.
Id.
127. See Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998) (neglecting to mention
the wishes of the children or Joey's testimony); see also Transcript of Proceedings, supra
note 22, at 10, 13 (providing testimony by Joey-Kenny did not testify-that he had no
preference about whom to live with and that he liked Tim and felt comfortable around
him); id. at 46, 70 (providing testimony by Fred Smith that the children had always lived
with him before their mother obtained custody by suing him after she forced him to
acknowledge his sexual orientation to the children). One can argue it was the mother, not
the father, who destabilized the boys' lives.
128. The trial court failed to incorporate into its findings that William Pulliam had
alcohol problems. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 22, at 70-71, for testimony of
Fred Smith that Carol Pulliam told him William was "definitely an alcoholic." The court
also failed to account for the fact that William Pulliam had a son from a previous marriage
that Joey and Kenny would have to integrate into their lives. Moreover, the trial court did
not include in its findings that "the children [were] well adjusted, attend[ed] school
regularly, ma[de] good grades, and participate[d] in after school athletics." Pulliam v.
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allows courts, as in Pulliam, to abrogate their responsibility to choose
the "environment, which will ... best encourage full development of
the child's physical, mental, emotional, moral and spiritual
faculties"' 9 by presuming harm from a parent's sexual orientation
when none is evidenced.
Another problem with the Pulliam court's presumption of harm
approach is its emphasis on the fact that Fred Smith's sexual activity
was extramarital.13 ° The consideration of nonmarital sexual activity in
prohibiting custody to gay and lesbian parents "ignores the fact that
unmarried gay couples can be just as loving and competent caregivers
as married straight couples." '131 Critics may argue that, fair or not,
because persons of the same sex lack the ability to marry, 132 their
relationships lack the stability that creates a proper environment to
raise children. Nonetheless, gay and lesbian parents can "provide
home environments in which children can thrive,"'33  and
"homosexual relationships are equally capable of including the love
and commitment regarded as inherent in marriage." '134 Furthermore,
as of the publication of this Comment, all but two states
(Massachusetts and Connecticut) deny gay and lesbians the right to
marry.135 "Cohabitating gay people who wish to marry but are
Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 149, 476 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1996), rev'd, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d
898 (1998).
129. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 375-76, 451 S.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1994)
(quoting In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 645, 290 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1982)).
130. See Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 626-27, 501 S.E.2d at 904 (citing as detrimental to the
children acts by the unmarried couple which occurred in the home and the unmarried
couple allowing the children to see them lying in bed together).
131. Larsen, supra note 97, at 91.
132. North Carolina does not recognize same-sex marriage. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2
(2007) ("Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or performed outside of
North Carolina, between individuals of the same gender are not valid in North
Carolina.").
133. Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millennium: On Equal Protection and the Right
to Marry, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 61, 80 (2000).
134. Bruce D. Gill, Comment, Best Interest of the Child? A Critique of Judicially
Sanctioned Arguments Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 68 TENN. L. REV.
361, 390 (2001) (providing additional reasons that "courts should focus only on actual
harm to the child" such as the consideration that "[since] many custody proceedings take
place after divorce, examples of loving and committed relationships, regardless of whether
the relationship is a marital one, could restore a child's confidence in intimate relations in
the aftermath of divorce").
135. See John Christofferson, After California Loss, Gays Get Right to Wed in
Connecticut, YAHOO! NEWS, Nov. 12, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081112/ap-on-
re_us/gay_ marriage. Although the Supreme Court of California in late May 2008 found
gays and lesbians had the right to marry, see Adam Liptak, California Court Overturns a
Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at Al, California voters, in the
November 2008 elections, approved a referendum 52.5% to 47.5% that overturned the
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prevented by law are surely not choosing a life of unmarried
cohabitation. They are choosing to live together rather than apart."'36
Given the current state of the law, it is circular and unfair to deny gay
and lesbian parents custody based on extramarital sexual activity. 3'
Additionally, Pulliam set precedent disadvantaging gay and
lesbian parents by finding that Fred Smith's private sexual activity
while the children were in the home supported a change of custody.'38
This reasoning is erroneous both because it violates the nexus
requirement and because it conflicts with subsequent North Carolina
decisions, such as Browning v. Helff,'3 9 thus discriminating against
same-sex couples by creating a double standard. In Browning, the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that "the fact that the
children were present [when one parent was residing with a person of
opposite sex in a nonmarital relationship] cannot be construed as a
finding that the children's welfare was affected."' 140 As in Pulliam, the
father in Browning was living with a person in a nonmarital
relationship.'41 Browning is consistent with the nexus test requiring
effect on the child to modify custody.'42 The Browning court vacated
a trial court's modification of visitation because there was a lack of
evidence that the former husband's cohabitation with his girlfriend
had effect on the children.'43 In Pulliam, the children were not
witnesses to the couple's sexual activity because it took place in
Fred's private bedroom with the door closed and locked.'" Thus, to
be in harmony with the nexus requirement and now with Browning,
the court in Pulliam could not conclude that the boys were affected
by Fred Smith's private sexual activity simply because they were in
the home.
Yet the Supreme Court of North Carolina found the children
were affected by their father's conduct. 145  The most plausible
justification for Pulliam's finding is that the court discriminated
court decision. CNN, Gay Marriage Supporters Take to California Streets,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/ US/11/08/same.sex.protests/ index.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2008). Lawsuits challenging the initiative are pending at the time of this Comment. Id.
136. Larsen, supra note 97, at 90-91 (concluding it is not "intellectually honest for
courts to assert that unmarried cohabitation is a choice").
137. See Gill, supra note 134.
138. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 626-27, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1998).
139. 136 N.C. App. 420, 524 S.E.2d 95 (2000).
140. Id. at 424, 524 S.E.2d at 98.
141. Id. at 422, 524 S.E.2d at 97.
142. See Shapiro, supra note 38, at 633.
143. Browning, 136 N.C. App. at 424, 524 S.E.2d at 98.
144. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 22, at 42.
145. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 626-27, 501 S.E.2d at 904.
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against Fred Smith because he engaged in sexual activity with another
man. This explanation is supported by the court's silence on the same
conduct Carol Pulliam engaged in with William Pulliam. 146  Carol
even admitted "engaging in oral sex [with William] before and after
she was married.' 147 Because Pulliam remains good law in North
Carolina, while being at odds with Browning and similar cases
involving heterosexual parents, gay and lesbian parents face a double
standard. 148 It is unclear how gay and lesbian parents can ever meet
this higher standard. Perhaps the standard would be satisfied if
homosexual parents did not reside with their partners, did not "come
out" to (and be honest with) their children, did not keep private
material in the home (no matter that it was stored where the children
would not find it), and did not privately engage in intimate conduct
with their life partner while the children were in the home. However,
all those activities are central to the identity of a homosexual person.
Pulliam has not been the only case to build this double standard
for gay and lesbian parents. Such a standard is also seen in Newsome
v. Newsome.149 In Newsome, a mother who had custody of her
daughter by a separation agreement lost custody after the father
alleged a change of circumstances based on his discovery of the
mother's homosexual relationship. 5 ' The father's parents, the
mother's friends, and a former co-worker of the mother all testified
that the child was well cared for and that the mother was a good
parent. 5' The trial court even found that "the evidence presented by
both the [plaintiff-mother and defendant-father tended] to show that
the plaintiff [had] in fact been a good mother to the minor child ... in
146. See generally Pulliam, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (failing to mention that Carol
Pulliam engaged in oral sex with William Pulliam). Carol Pulliam admitted to engaging in
oral sex during trial. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 22, at 113.
147. Neff, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
148. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.14c ("Presumably the reason for a more stringent
standard for conduct by gay and lesbian parents is the concern that the child's awareness
of the conduct will affect the child's sexual orientation. What little research there is,
however, suggests that the sexual orientation of the parents makes no identifiable
difference in the orientation of the child.").
149. 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979).
150. Id. at 417, 423, 427, 256 S.E.2d at 850, 853, 855 (noting also that the mother
"denied being a homosexual"). "None of ... [the mother's friends] admitted to any
knowledge of a homosexual relationship." Id. at 422, 256 S.E.2d at 853. On the other
hand, the trial court found that the defendant alleged the mother "ha[d] engaged in an
illicit homosexual relationship... in the presence and on the premises occupied by the...
minor child." Id. at 418, 256 S.E.2d at 850. There was testimony that the mother shared a
bedroom with a female and that the couple were seen wearing wedding rings. Id. at 419-
20, 256 S.E.2d at 851.
151. Id. at 420-22, 256 S.E.2d at 852-53.
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that she has provided very sufficiently for the physical needs and
requirements [of the] minor child."'15 2 Even so, the court gave custody
to the father based on the finding that "the environment in which the
minor child [was then] being raised [was] not conducive or beneficial
to the raising of a minor child."'53 The Court of Appeals of North
Carolina upheld the trial court's change of custody, noting:
There is certainly an abundance of evidence to support the
critical finding that the environment in which plaintiff has
placed the child is not in the child's best interest. The evidence
would have supported much stronger findings. It may well be
that the judge struggled to spare the child as much future
embarrassment as possible. 54
The courts in Newsome, as in Pulliam, removed custody from a
parent because of the parent's sexual orientation without satisfying
the nexus requirement involved in determining the best interest of the
children.' In both cases, evidence showed the children actually
doing well in their environment and the respective gay or lesbian
parents being good caregivers.'56 Yet in both cases, the courts
improperly focused on the sexual orientation of the parents. This
demands the conclusion that these parents were held to a different,
higher standard than would have been used for heterosexual
parents.1"
True to this deduction, the nexus test has been properly applied
when homosexuality is not an issue, as in Browning v. Helff58 and
152. Id. at 423, 256 S.E.2d at 853.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 427, 256 S.E.2d at 855.
155. See supra Part I.C (providing modification standard); see also supra Part I.D
(analyzing how Pulliam lacked evidence of effect on the children). See generally
Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (neglecting to note any negative effects on the
child as a result of the mother's alleged homosexual relationship).
156. See Newsome, 42 N.C. App. at 423, 256 S.E.2d at 853; Transcript of Proceedings,
supra note 22, at 12, 56, 59.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (showing the focus of the courts in
Pulliam). The trial court in Newsome admitted the following testimony focusing on the
mother's alleged sexual orientation: where the mother and another female lived and when
they quit their jobs, the father's belief that the mother was engaged in an "illicit
homosexual relationship," the opinion of others about the relationship, the mother's
former coworker's conversation with the mother about her sexual orientation, the
mother's testimony about rumors of her sexual orientation, and the mother's friends'
testimony about those same rumors. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. at 418-22, 427, 256 S.E.2d at
850-53, 855. That the judge meant to spare "the child as much future embarrassment as
possible" also may indicate a judicial bias against homosexuals. Id. at 427, 256 S.E.2d at
855.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
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Blackley v. Blackley.159 In Blackley, a father filed a motion to modify
an order granting the mother custody of their two children on the
basis of premarital nighttime visits to the mother's home by a man the
mother subsequently married.1"° As in Pulliam, evidence showed that
the mother and her partner were not married at the time, and the
children saw the couple in the mother's bedroom.' Also similar to
the children in Pulliam, the children in Blackley were "well and
healthy" and "properly schooled." '162 But unlike Pulliam, where the
children had no conflict with Fred Smith's partner, evidence was
presented in Blackley that the mother's partner "popped" the male
child.163 According to the analysis in Pulliam, the fact that the
children were present in the home while a nonmarital relationship
occurred was sufficient to justify a modification in custody."6
However, in spite of the evidence of discipline by the stepfather, the
Blackley court found insufficient evidence that the child was or would
be "adversely affected because of the chastisement by his stepfather
or his stepfather's premarital [overnight] visits with [the mother]." '65
Once again, sexual orientation appears to be the rationale for the
different outcomes.
166
Another defect in the Pulliam presumption of harm approach is
that it denies gay and lesbian individuals the freedom to be
themselves. The fact that society, in this case the courts, forces gays
and lesbians to downplay their sexual orientation-to minimize it as
part of their identity-has been referred to as "covering. "167 This
159. 18 N.C. App. 535,197 S.E.2d 243 (1973).
160. Id. at 536, 197 S.E.2d at 243.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 537, 197 S.E.2d at 244.
163. Id. at 536, 197 S.E.2d at 243.
164. See supra text accompanying note 85.
165. Blackley, 18 N.C. App. at 538, 197 S.E.2d at 245.
166. While this Comment argues that sexual orientation often inappropriately causes
North Carolina courts to deviate from the standard for modifying custody orders, it does
not assert that it is the only reason courts sometimes deviate from the standard or that
homosexual parents are the only ones affected by the courts' deviations. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Adolf, 149 N.C. App. 876, 878, 561 S.E.2d 588, 589 (2002) (reversing the trial court
because it failed to determine if the substantial change in circumstances had effect on the
child and never determined the best interest of the child in a custody case between the
maternal grandmother and the parents). However, that other families are impacted by the
failure of North Carolina courts to meet the standard for modifying custody orders does
not lessen the effect on gay and lesbian parents.
167. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS, Preface (2006) ("It is a fact that persons who are ready to admit possession of a
stigma may nonetheless make a great effort to keep the stigma from looming large ....
This process will be referred to as covering." (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102 (Prentice Hall, 1983))).
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demand to "cover" is easy to spot in cases like Pulliam in which
courts have removed custody from a gay or lesbian parent. In those
cases, gay and lesbian parents are punished for engaging in activity
that defines them as homosexual individuals-whether it be living
with their life partner, having intimate relations with their life
partner, or being honest with their children about their sexual
orientation. 6 ' These individuals have to pay a terrible price for the
freedom of living authentic lives: the loss of their children.
A less obvious observation is that this demand to cover is just as
prevalent in custody cases in which gay and lesbian parents can be
said to have "prevailed." These "wins" sometime come at great
sacrifice for gay and lesbian parents: not seeing their significant
other, not sharing a living arrangement with a significant other, or not
making natural physical displays of affection while their children are
present. In Woodruff v. Woodruff,'6 9 the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina upheld the trial court's award of "unsupervised overnight
visitation rights" to a gay father with the condition that the child not
be in the presence of any boyfriends and the father not have
boyfriends over while the child was with him.17 The gay father can be
said to have "won" because he retained visitation rights and also
because the court found that "a severance of the father-son
relationship in this case would be detrimental to the child's wellbeing
[sic] and that maintenance of the father-son relationship would be
beneficial and in the child's best interest....' The court, however, also
exhibited homophobia when it held the father could retain visitation
rights only after an expert in clinical psychology testified "there [was]
no known cause of male homosexuality ... [and] in his professional
[O]ur major civil rights laws ... do not currently provide much protection against
covering demands. Courts have often interpreted these laws to protect statuses,
but not behaviors, being but not doing. For this reason, courts will often not
protect individuals against covering demands, which target behavioral aspects of
identity-speaking a language, having a child, holding a same-sex commitment
ceremony, wearing a religious garb ....
American equality law must be reformed to protect individuals.
Id. at 23-24.
168. See id. at 101 ("A survey of state practices ... reveals convergence around the
same general rule-gays who cover retain their children, gays who fail to do so risk losing
them."); see also Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 417, 256 S.E.2d 849,855 (1979)
(taking custody away from a mother based in part on the allegation that she was living
with another woman in a homosexual relationship).
169. 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979).
170. Id. at 352-53, 260 S.E.2d at 776-77.
171. Id. at 353, 260 S.E.2d at 776-77.
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expert opinion, the son of a homosexual father [would] not inherit
that homosexuality." '172 Regrettably, the court forced the father to
choose between his life partner and his child by allowing visitation
only when the father had no partner present.
Even while prevailing in court, a gay or lesbian parent is forced
to confront the double standard imposed by Pulliam and resort to
arguments that should not have to be made. For example, in
Epperson v. Epperson,'173 a lesbian mother fought a visitation
restriction that "she [not] have persons present overnight ... 'unless
these persons [were] related by blood or heterosexual marriage.' "74
Part of the mother's argument was that the visitation order already
forbade any affection in the presence of her children, and, therefore,
the limitation barring overnight guests was only aimed at
homosexuality itself.'75 The court vacated and remanded the case, 76
but at great costs to the mother. In order to prevail, she was forced to
agree not to show affection with her life partner. 77 She was forced to
choose between her children and a life partner. The "victories" of
Woodruff and Epperson combined with the defeats of Newsome and
Pulliam seem to establish the principle that it is only acceptable to be
a homosexual if one does not act like a homosexual.
178
The presumption of harm standard also leads courts to explore
moral consideration instead of focusing on the welfare of the
children. In Pulliam, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found
that "failing and refusing to counsel the children against
[homosexual] conduct while acknowledging this conduct to them"
supported the change in custody.179 This statement has no evidentiary
value but is merely a judicial proclamation of opinion regarding the
propriety of the conduct. Fred and Tim acknowledged they were a
couple and did not indicate to the children that their relationship was
wrong, thus making clear that it is the court that considers the
relationship wrong.' 80 The supreme court did not base its opinion on
172. Id. at 353, 260 S.E.2d at 776.
173. No. 99-1003, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 766 (N.C. Ct. App. June 20,2000).
174. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 10, Epperson v. Epperson, 1999 WL 33758969
(N.C. Ct. App. June 20, 2000) (No. 99-1003).
175. Id. at 10-11.
176. Epperson, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 766, at *1.
177. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 174, at 10.
178. This is covering in its clearest form. See YOSHINO, supra note 167, at 101.
179. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 627, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1998).
180. Id. at 626-27, 501 S.E.2d at 903-04; Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 22, at
142 (testimony of Tim Tipton).
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legal grounds, such as the illegality of the conduct. 81 In addition, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's opinion that homosexual conduct
should be counseled against reinforces the double standard which
Pulliam purports to reject because "[f]ew courts would likely have the
audacity to tell straight parents when it is appropriate to educate their
children about sexuality."1"
In sum, Pulliam's presumption of harm approach was
problematic from the start because it disqualifies otherwise
competent gay and lesbian parents from having custody of their
children solely on the basis of their sexual orientation, unfairly
penalizes gay and lesbian parents for not marrying when they have no
option to do so, creates a double standard for considering sexual
activity in custody cases, and denies gay and lesbian parents the basic
freedom to be themselves. Because such an approach allows courts to
diverge from focus on the best interest of the children, courts often
explore their own moral opinions about the sexual orientation of the
parents. This divergence was erroneous at Pulliam's announcement
and is even more problematic in the face of a national trend towards
the nexus test.
B. Other States Have Increasingly Adopted the Nexus Test and
Rejected the Speculation and Stereotypes Characterizing the
Pulliam Approach
Across the country, courts have shifted "away from per se rules
disqualifying lesbian and gay parents"'83 and toward the nexus test.' 4
In the midst of this trend, Pulliam remains at the opposite end of the
spectrum: its analysis rejected the nexus requirement and adopted
the presumption of harm standard, which is more in harmony with the
per se rule.185 Several plausible reasons exist for courts' increasing
181. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 626-27, 501 S.E.2d at 903-04. Incidentally, illegality is now
an improper basis for such opinion after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that all Americans have the right to engage
in private, intimate conduct free from government intrusion. Id. at 578; see discussion
infra Part II.C. It should be noted that a substantial part of the trial court's findings and
reasoning supporting a change in custody was that the private sexual conduct was illegal.
See Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 32 (finding the defendant's conduct was illegal
and "[t]hat despite the fact that the said behavior is a violation of G.S. 14-177 the
Defendant testified that there was nothing wrong with his relationship with Tim Tipton").
182. Larsen, supra note 97, at 81.
183. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 639.
184. Id. at 635 ("Courts in a majority of the jurisdictions that have considered within
the last twenty years a parent's homosexuality in assessing an individual's fitness as a
parent have expressed approval of the basic principles of the nexus test.").
185. See supra Part I.D.
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rejection of the per se rule. Because the presumption of harm
approach and the per se rule both result in homosexual parents losing
custody of their children based on their sexual orientation and both
share many of the same misconceptions about homosexuality, these
reasons are additional justifications for overruling Pulliam.'86 First,
the per se approach against gay and lesbian parents is questionable
under Lawrence v. Texas,87 because this approach relies on moral
justification alone and not on the effect on the children.'88 Second,
social science research does not support the "assumption that lesbian
and gay parents invariably harm their children" and, in fact, shows
otherwise.'89 Finally, society is increasingly embracing its gay and
lesbian citizens, leaving the per se rule outmoded. 9
During this movement away from the per se rule, a majority of
jurisdictions have approved of the nexus test when a parent's sexual
orientation was at issue. 91 For example, in Jacoby v. Jacoby, 92 the
Second District Court of Appeal of Florida adopted the nexus test
and reversed the lower court's decision because it shifted custody
from the mother to the father due to the mother's sexual orientation,
despite finding no evidence of harm to the children.'93 It recognized
that "[f]or a court to properly consider conduct such as Mrs. Jacoby's
sexual orientation on the issue of custody, the conduct must have a
direct effect or impact upon the children." '194 The court further made
clear that the application of the nexus requirement was the reason for
the reversal: "The connection between the conduct and the harm to
186. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
187. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
188. See discussion infra Part II.C.
189. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 638-39.
190. Id. at 639. In Gallup's annual Values and Beliefs Survey, while the public was
split on the morality of homosexual conduct at forty-eight percent to forty-eight percent,
these percentages are a swing from just the beginning of this decade where majorities
found such conduct wrong (fifty-five percent thought homosexuality was immoral in 2002).
See Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, GALLUP, June
18, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-
Homosexuality.aspx (finding that majorities now believe that homosexual relations should
be legal and fifty-seven percent believe homosexuality should be accepted as an
"alternative lifestyle"). Additionally, the Survey revealed that eighty-nine percent
believed gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against in employment. Id.
191. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 635-36 ("Application of a nexus test to the question of a
parent's homosexuality is consistent with the general family law principle that most
parental characteristics are relevant only if they can be shown to have an impact on the
child.").
192. 763 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
193. Id. at 415; see also Shapiro, supra note 38, at 635 n.67 (listing twenty-seven states
as of 1996-before the Pulliam decision-to have adopted the basics of a nexus test).
194. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d at 413.
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the children must have an evidentiary basis; it cannot be assumed ...
[that] the court's comments concerning the negative impact of the
mother's sexual orientation on the children ... [are] conclusory or
unsupported by the evidence." '195
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, while not overruling
Pulliam, did recognize the trend towards the nexus test in Shipman v.
Shipman,'96 a heterosexual custody case, decided in 2003.197 In
Shipman, the court upheld the trial court's change of custody from
the mother to the father based on several findings, including that the
mother moved frequently, did not have a home, sought to prevent the
father from seeing the child, and permitted the child to stay in a home
where the mother had been molested.198 To reach that holding, the
court articulated the standard that "before a child custody order may
be modified, the evidence must demonstrate a connection between
the substantial change in circumstances and the welfare of the child,
and flowing from that prerequisite is the requirement that the trial
court make findings of fact regarding that connection." '199 While this
was a step in the right direction for North Carolina courts, the court
failed to appropriately interpret Pulliam, citing the case for the
proposition that "where the substantial change involves a discrete set
of circumstances such as ... a change in a parent's sexual orientation,
the effects of the change on the welfare of the child are not self-
evident and ... [require] evidence directly linking the change to the
welfare of the child." ' The first problem is that the court failed to
recognize that the change in Pulliam was not that Fred Smith
"changed" into a homosexual. This statement indicates that the court
was still willing to focus inappropriately on the sexual orientation of
the parents in custody determinations. The second problem is that
while the standard itself is correct-the nexus test requires evidence
of effect on the children-the court views Pulliam as consistent with
that approach. In reality, however, Pulliam did not apply the nexus
test but instead utilized the presumption of harm standard.0 1
195. Id. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Pulliam made a strikingly similar
holding. See Pulliam v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 148-49, 476 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1996),
rev'd, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
196. 357 N.C. 471, 586 S.E.2d 250 (2003).
197. Id. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255-56.
198. Id. at 475-76, 586 S.E.2d at 254 (finding that these factors "warrant[ed] the court's
intervention").
199. Id. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255.
200. Id. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 256 (internal citations omitted).
201. See supra Part I.D.
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C. How Lawrence v. Texas Undermines Pulliam's Presumption of
Harm Approach
In the middle of the trend towards the nexus test, the Supreme
Court of the United States in 2003 announced Lawrence v. Texas,
which wholly undermined the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
approach in Pulliam. The Supreme Court in Lawrence announced
that adults, including gays and lesbians, had the right to engage in
private, intimate conduct without government intervention. °2 When
police responded to a weapons disturbance complaint at Lawrence's
apartment, they entered his home, saw Lawrence and another male
engaged in a sexual act, arrested both men, and held them in
overnight custody. °3 The men were convicted in lower court of
violating a "Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.""2 4  The
Supreme Court of the United States struck down the statute as
unconstitutional. In its holding, the Court unambiguously
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,2 °6 which previously held there was no
"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 2 7  Not
confining the holding of Lawrence to the principle that there is a
constitutional right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy, the
Supreme Court "more broadly announced a substantive due process
right of adult sexual intimacy for all Americans. '2°8  The Court
grounded this right in an expansive interpretation of liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Liberty protects
202. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
203. Id. at 562-63.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 558.
206. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
207. Id. at 191; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
208. Larsen, supra note 97, at 57 (noting also that "since heterosexuals already enjoyed
an unspoken right to lead sex lives safe from government intrusion, Lawrence is also a
kind of equal protection ruling for extending this unofficial right to same-sex couples"
(footnote omitted)). Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, explicitly based her
conclusion on an Equal Protection analysis. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor recognized the importance of this case in the field of
family law. Id. at 581-82 ("Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals,
thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as
everyone else .... Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the
law ... that the law 'legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of
ways unrelated to the criminal law,' including in the areas of 'employment, family issues,
and housing.' " (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992) (emphasis
added))).
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the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling
or other private places ... [and this l]iberty presumes an autonomy of
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct., 2°9  The Court explained that "[w]hen sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.,
21
1
Fred Smith and his partner engaged in intimate conduct within
the broad definition of liberty set out by Lawrence. The trial court in
Pulliam specifically found that the sexual activity between Fred Smith
and Tim Tipton violated North Carolina's sodomy law, and it used
this fact to justify removing custody of Fred's two sons.21  This
justification is no longer legitimate because, under Lawrence, the
North Carolina sodomy statute is unconstitutional as it relates to Fred
and Tim's consensual conduct occurring inside Fred's private
residence.212 Although it never referred by name to the sodomy
statute when it upheld the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina relied on the exact same private sexual conduct
used by the trial court to deny Fred Smith custody.2"3 Critics will
argue that while Lawrence clearly presses for altering the law where
consensual sexual conduct among adults is concerned, the interests of
children were not at stake in the case.214  This Comment
209. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added); see also Larsen, supra note 97, at 58
("Focusing on the rights of a 'person' rather than those of a 'gay person,' the Court
explicitly found that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the freedom
to engage in 'certain intimate conduct.' ").
210. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean [homosexual persons'] existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government.
Id. at 578.
211. See Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 32, 37.
212. See North Carolina Gay and Lesbian Attorneys, Legal Guide, Sodomy Law,
http://ncgala.org/guide/guidesodomy.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008); see also North
Carolina v. Whiteley, 172 N.C. App. 772, 773, 779, 616 S.E.2d 576, 577, 581 (2005) (holding
the Crime Against Nature statute unconstitutional when applied to private, consensual
sexual conduct between adults); Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 32-33 (detailing
the private nature of the couple's sexual conduct).
213. See discussion supra Part I.D.
214. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has already
declined to apply Lawrence in a case when juveniles were prosecuted under North
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acknowledges that since "[t]he welfare of the child has always been
the polar star which guides courts in awarding custody, 215 it is logical
that parents' interests in sexual autonomy must be balanced against
the interests of the children.
While the welfare of the child should always be the central
concern in custody cases, this does not mean that courts are free to
ignore Lawrence's declaration against the use of morality to oppress
gays and lesbians. "State power over domestic relations is not
without constitutional limits." '216 While family law is an area largely
left to the states, it is "limited by ... constitutional principles." '217
Lawrence declared a principle against the use of moral justification to
disadvantage gays and lesbians and can be viewed as setting a public
policy against this discrimination.218 The Supreme Court rejected
Bowers' use of morality to determine constitutional guarantees: "The
Bowers Court was, of course, making the broader point that for
centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual
conduct as immoral, but this Court's obligation is to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate its own moral code." '219 One commentator has
noted that Lawrence's approach "open[s] the door for constitutional
considerations to reflect changing social values and to vindicate the
rights of those engaged in harmless conduct that departs from social
norms."22  In rejecting this moral-based reasoning, the Supreme
Carolina's Crime Against Nature statute. See In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 295, 643 S.E.2d
920, 925 (2007).
215. Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 424, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2000) (quoting
Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 619, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899 (1998)).
216. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978).
217. Larsen, supra note 97, at 67 ("The Supreme Court has found the Constitution to
contain several rights bearing on family relationships, including the rights to engage in
intimate sexual behavior, marry, raise children, safeguard intimate family bonds, use
contraception, and terminate pregnancies." (footnotes omitted)).
218. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559, 575; Larsen, supra note 97, at 64. The public policy
argument is analogous to the policy set against racial discrimination. See text
accompanying infra notes 286-91 (applying Palmore v. Sidodi and its policy against
allowing stigma from racial discrimination to affect custody in the gay and lesbian parent
custody context).
219. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559.
220. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 861-
62 (4th ed. 2004). Similarly, one North Carolina court heard Lawrence's summons against
the use of morality to limit sexual autonomy when, in 2006, it found the state statute
against fornication unconstitutional as a violation of the "due process right to liberty as
explained in Lawrence v. Texas." Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL 3103008, at
*1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006). The statute, also referred to as the "fornication and
adultery statute," provided: "If any man and woman, not being married to each other,
shall lewdly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a
Class 2 misdemeanor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2007). The case arose when "Debora
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Court in Lawrence realized that its holding had an impact against
discrimination directed at gays and lesbians in areas far beyond sexual
conduct in the home because "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres. '221 Indeed, the court's analysis in
Pulliam shows there was good reason for the Supreme Court to be
concerned about discrimination against homosexuals in the private
sphere and homosexuals' autonomy in forming family relationships.222
In Pulliam, the Supreme Court of North Carolina relied on its
own moral view to deny Fred Smith custody of his two sons. The
North Carolina standard for modification of custody orders was never
satisfied because there was insufficient evidence of harm to the
children.223 Without a finding of harm, the court failed to act in the
best interest of the children when it removed them from their father's
custody. 224 Because the Supreme Court of North Carolina presumed
harm from Fred Smith's homosexuality in violation of the nexus test,
only its moral condemnation of the private, consensual sexual
conduct of Fred Smith can explain penalizing him by removing
custody of his children.225  Thus, Pulliam runs afoul of the
constitutional decision in Lawrence, not because Pulliam explicitly
Lynn Hobbs, who had been employed by the county as an emergency dispatcher until the
sheriff discovered that she was living with a boyfriend[, was] .. . told [by the sheriff that]
... she had three choices: marry, move, or leave her job, citing the criminal statute."
Arthur S. Leonard, Mopping up Operation on Sex Crimes, LEONARD LINK, Nov. 6, 2006,
http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2006/11/mopping-up-oper.html.
Because Lawrence's holding applied broadly to all persons, not just homosexuals, see
Larsen, supra note 97, at 57, the superior court in Hobbs used Lawrence's definition of due
process liberty to strike down a restriction on private intimate conduct. Hobbs, 2006 WL
3103008, at *1. Morality without harm was an insufficient justification to limit sexual
autonomy. The fornication statute can be seen as nothing more than the state's moral
code.
221. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
222. See id. at 574-76.
223. See discussion supra Part I.D.
224. If real harm to the child is found, perhaps one could argue that Lawrence has less
bearing on a custody decision. However, that is not the case in Pulliam because, as
discussed previously, there was no evidence of harm to the children from Fred Smith's
homosexuality. See discussion supra Part I.D.
225. Because the court did not specify any true harm to the children, it is unclear what
the basis for its moral concerns was. Whatever the concerns, they are invalid
considerations because Lawrence holds that disfavoring gays and lesbians based on moral
disapproval is unconstitutional. See Larsen, supra note 97, at 74, 76-77 (detailing how the
various "adverse effects" that courts assume against children of gay parents do not "hold
up under scrutiny," such as "anxieties that the children will develop bad habits, come to
hold pro-gay views, grow up to be gay, or become confused about sex or traditional gender
roles" (footnotes omitted)).
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denies gays and lesbians the right to engage in sexual activity, but
because it contradicts the principle of Lawrence by penalizing a
homosexual parent for engaging in that activity.226 The change of
custody based on the court's moral view about homosexuality, rather
than any effect on the children, defies both the nexus test and the
precepts set out in Lawrence that the mere existence of gays and
lesbians should not be "demeaned" and that morality alone is
insufficient to justify discrimination. 27 Justice Webb was correct in
his Pulliam dissent when he wrote that the majority "recites actions
by the defendant which the majority considers to be distasteful,
immoral, or even illegal and says this evidence supports findings of
fact which allow a change in custody. '28  As a consequence, the
Pulliam majority's moral conclusion was the "product[] of
discriminatory biases that courts cannot constitutionally credit.,
229
Gay parents should not be penalized for living with their life
partners.23° One can hardly imagine a harsher penalty in a custody
case than losing children one has raised since birth, but this loss was
the consequence of Fred Smith's choice to live with the person he
loved.2 1  As part of the due process right to liberty interpreted in
Lawrence, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
homosexuals-just as heterosexuals-may seek autonomy to raise
226. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 626-27, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1998). See generally
discussion supra Part I.D (illustrating the court's sole focus on the sexual conduct of Fred
Smith).
227. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 578.
228. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 629, 501 S.E.2d at 905 (Webb, J., dissenting).
229. Larsen, supra note 97, at 84. In fact, the Supreme Court has found that "a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (citing U.S. Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). For an interesting discussion on the interplay between
Lawrence and Romer, see Larsen, supra note 97, at 60-64. However, courts have
sometimes been receptive to arguments limiting the application of Lawrence because the
interests of children were at stake. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida's ban on adoption by homosexuals
by distinguishing the criminal sanction in Lawrence and the adoption of children). In
Lofton, the court noted: "Here, the involved actors are not only consenting adults, but
minors as well. The relevant state action is not criminal prohibition, but grant of a
statutory privilege." Id. at 817. Although both Lofton and Pulliam involve children as
well as consenting adults, this Comment would differentiate Lofton because, whereas it
dealt with a statutory adoption, Fred Smith in Pulliam was the natural father of the two
children at the center of the custody dispute.
230. Larsen, supra note 97, at 94.
231. See Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 621-22, 628, 501 S.E.2d at 900-01, 904; Transcript of
Record, supra note 21, at 36.
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children and form families.2 3' The Supreme Court of North Carolina
in Pulliam inappropriately denied Fred Smith this autonomy.233
Beyond the Court's caution in Lawrence against using moral-
based reasoning to disadvantage homosexuals, the case undermines
Pulliam in other ways. First, despite the limits on Lawrence's holding
proclaimed by the Court, 34 the decision does encompass wording
particularly relevant to child custody cases involving gay and lesbian
parents. In referencing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,235 the Court took note that the Constitution
protects a person's decisions to build a family and to raise children:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.236
This language gives weight to the argument put forth by gay and
lesbian parents that they may not be held to a discriminatory
standard. Second, while cautioning against "demeaning" the lives of
gays and lesbians and also adopting an expansive view of liberty, the
Court in Lawrence advocated a view of the Constitution consistent
with greater equality for gay and lesbian citizens: "[The framers]
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
232. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
233. See Larsen, supra note 97, at 68 (taking this idea even further and making a strong
argument that gay parents have a "fundamental right ... [protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment] to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children"). "Millions of gay people are parents, and to fence them out of the
constitutional rights guaranteed to parents generally would violate Lawrence's
proscriptions against 'demeaning the lives of homosexual persons.' " Id.
234. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
235. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
236. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (emphasis added).
This recognition of the autonomy of persons to form homosexual relationships was
monumental because "Lawrence erased the division that Bowers had imposed between
gay and straight sexuality, thereby lifting the legal opprobrium that had for seventeen
years hung over gay people." Larsen, supra note 97, at 59.
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can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom." '37
As society adopts increased tolerance for gay and lesbian individuals,
this constitutional view supports embracing a non-discriminatory
custody standard.
As it relates to custody proceedings, Lawrence has impacted both
the arguments parties have made and the analyses by the courts in
other states.238 Two examples are L.A.M. v. B.M.239 and McGriff v.
McGriff.24° In L.A.M., a lesbian mother fighting to retain custody of
her child argued that Lawrence overruled a prior Alabama Supreme
Court decision that removed custody from another lesbian mother.241
The mother relied on Lawrence's admonition against moral-based
reasoning, but the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama found that this
reasoning did not mean the Alabama Supreme Court's prior decision
was overruled because Lawrence involved only a statute criminalizing
conduct.242 The court of civil appeals distinguished these custody
cases by finding that in such cases, the court's function was simply to
review evidence and to determine if a change in custody was
supported, not to determine the legality of a criminal statute or the
"morality of homosexuality. '243  The court ultimately found that
sufficient evidence existed to take custody away from the lesbian
mother.2" While the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama recognized
that the interests of children were not at stake in Lawrence,245 even
under the standard the Alabama court adopted, the Pulliam court's
reasoning fails because there was not sufficient evidence that Fred
Smith's homosexuality affected the children to justify a custody
change.2 46  Therefore, L.A.M. does not undermine the foregoing
analysis of Lawrence's impact-a moral conclusion divorced from any
effect upon the child is insufficient to modify custody.
Significantly, the Supreme Court of Idaho acknowledged the
credibility of Lawrence's impact on child custody in McGriff, stating
that Lawrence "has at least some bearing on the degree to which
237. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
238. For a full and enlightening analysis on the impact of Lawrence on the rights of gay
and lesbian parents in the area of child custody, see generally Larsen, supra note 97
(arguing that courts are constitutionally forbidden from considering sexual orientation in
custody decisions).
239. 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
240. 99 P.3d 111 (Idaho 2004).
241. L.A.M., 906 So. 2d at 946.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 946-47.
245. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
246. See supra Part I.D.
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homosexuality may play a part in child custody proceedings. '247 In
McGriff, a homosexual father lost custody at the trial court level and
argued to the Supreme Court of Idaho that the magistrate
inappropriately decided the case based on the father's
homosexuality. 48 The Supreme Court of Idaho upheld the trial court,
finding that the magistrate did not rely on the father's homosexuality
in modifying custody but instead had decided the case based on the
father's refusal to communicate with the mother and the stress on the
children resulting from the custody situation at that time. 49 It noted
that courts around the country agreed that a change in custody based
on a parent's homosexuality is not permissible unless harm to the
child is evidenced.2 ' The court then adopted the nexus test: "Sexual
orientation, in and of itself, cannot be the basis for awarding or
removing custody; only when the parent's sexual orientation is shown
to cause harm to the child, such that the child's best interests are not
served, should sexual orientation be a factor in determining
custody." '251 Unlike the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Pulliam,
the Supreme Court of Idaho explicitly adopted the nexus test and
found the custody determination was not made-even in part-on the
losing parent's homosexuality.2 2 Lawrence played a major role both
in the court's refusal to base its decision on the sexual orientation of
the parent and in its adoption of the nexus test. 3
In conclusion, Pulliam's change of custody based on a moral
conclusion, rather than an effect on the children, has been
undermined by the warning of Lawrence that the existence of gays
and lesbians should not be "demeaned" and that the use of morality
alone cannot justify government prejudice against homosexuals. 4
Pulliam's moral-based analysis has been further destabilized by the
recognition of various courts that the broad principles announced in
Lawrence have an impact beyond the confines of an adult's right to
private, consensual sexual conduct. 5
247. McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117 (Idaho 2004).
248. Id. at 116-17.
249. Id. at 118-20.
250. Id. at 117 (citing In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); Pryor v. Pryor, 714 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760
(La. Ct. App. 1995); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 118.
253. Id. at 117.
254. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 578 (2003).
255. In addition to Hobbs v. Smith and the custody cases discussed earlier in this
Subsection, Lawrence has had an impact on the right of gays and lesbians to marry. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 953 (Mass. 2003).
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III. THE SOLUTION: A TRUE NEXUS TEST WITHOUT SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AS A FACTOR
To cure the flaws in North Carolina's approach to child custody
previously discussed, Pulliam v. Smith must be overruled, and North
Carolina courts should return to a true nexus test to adhere to the
"best interest of the child" standard which has long been the rule in
custody disputes.256 Traditionally, the nexus test requires courts to
find that a parent's homosexuality or sexual activity has some effect
on the child before that homosexuality or sexual activity is considered
in the custody determination." 7 This requirement of finding an effect
on the child is consistent with the requirement that the court ground
its decision in the best interest of the child. 8 "The other approaches
arbitrarily deprive fit parents of custody and bear no relationship to
the best interest standard." '259 Thus, both the per se rule and the
presumption of harm standard, as seen in Pulliam, fail to consider the
best interest of the child. "Far from it, these approaches often
sacrifice the interests of particular children in order to express judicial
disapproval of parental conduct."'260 Therefore, North Carolina courts
should return to the nexus test, which requires showing effect on the
child in order to meet the best interests of children in custody
disputes.
A. How to Prevent Misapplications of the Nexus Test
In theory, the nexus test just described appears advantageous for
gay and lesbian parents. Even under this standard, however, gay and
lesbian parents are discriminated against based solely on their sexual
256. See Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 424, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2000). See
generally Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without a
Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v. Rodgers and Price v.
Howard, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2145, 2155 n.36 (1998) (providing an exceptional history of the
development of the best interest standard as the polar star in North Carolina custody
cases). It is the best interest of the child that "is the paramount consideration which
guides the court in awarding the custody of the minor child." Paschall v. Paschall, 26 N.C.
App. 491, 493, 216 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1975); see also Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369,
375, 451 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1994) (noting, however, that trial courts have great discretion in
this area). Neither party has the burden of proof under this second prong. Evans v.
Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 139, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000) ("[T]he trial court has the
ultimate responsibility of requiring production of any evidence that may be competent and
relevant on the issue [of the best interest of the child]." (quoting Ramirez-Barker v.
Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 78, 418 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1982))); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App.
851, 853, 509 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1998).
257. See supra text accompanying note 53.
258. Meyers, supra note 113, at 843.
259. Id.
260. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 664.
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orientation.26 a Courts frequently misapply the nexus test in cases
involving gay and lesbian parents by: (1) hypothesizing about future
harm; and (2) generally failing to define harm.262  The first
misapplication happens when "courts engage in or permit speculation
about potential future harm, rather than confining the inquiry to
proven harm or even harm which is reasonably likely to occur. This
dilutes the essential ingredient of a nexus test-the requirement that
the parent's conduct cause harm., 263  The second misapplication
occurs because neither appellate courts nor the legislature 264 have
defined what satisfies the "effect" or "harm" requirement under the
nexus test.265 "This leaves trial judges and the appellate courts free to
identify wide-ranging and ill-defined harms, including stigma and
moral injury, without engaging in any careful analysis. 2 66  North
Carolina courts should address these misapplications head on.
First, in modification-of-custody cases, appellate courts should
prevent inappropriate speculation about future harm by requiring the
trial courts to make specific findings of fact. The trial court should be
required to find evidence that: (1) there has been a substantial
change of circumstances; (2) this change has an effect on the child;
and (3) modification of the custody order is in the child's best
interest. The findings of these three factors are critical to controlling
the broad discretion of the trial courts in custody matters. 67  The
appellate courts must be guided by the standard that "[s]ubstantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. ' 266  These findings are
purportedly required under the current standard for modifying
custody orders in North Carolina, 269 but the appellate courts must be
261. Id. at 642 ("The problems facing lesbian and gay parents are more serious than
reading recent opinions suggests: due to their often accurate perception that courts may
be hostile to them, lesbian and gay parents are disadvantaged in private resolution of
custody disputes and are less able to adopt strong bargaining positions.").
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra text accompanying note 49.
265. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 642.
266. Id. ("By invoking such harms and indulging in unsupported speculation about
their likely occurrence, courts can freely deny custody to lesbian and gay parents while
claiming to employ a nexus test.").
267. See Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000)
("[E]vidence of 'speculation or conjecture that a detrimental change may take place
sometime in the future' will not support a change in custody." (quoting Wehlau v. Witek,
75 N.C. App. 596, 599, 331 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1985))).
268. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003) (quoting State
v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)).
269. Id. at 474, 478, 586 S.E.2d at 253, 255.
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stricter when reviewing a lower court's findings. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina has stated that
[t]o avoid further confusion, [it] would encourage trial courts,
when memorializing their findings of fact, to pay particular
attention in explaining whether any change in circumstances
can be deemed substantial, whether that change affected the
welfare of the minor child, and, finally, why modification is in
the child's best interest.27 °
The stakes are too high for mere encouragement to be enough;
appellate courts should remand cases if these findings are not made.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Pulliam failed to recognize
that the trial court made no findings supported by substantial
evidence that the change in circumstances had an effect on the
children.271
Monitoring the discretion of the lower courts through required
findings of fact alone is insufficient to eliminate the double standard
that exists for gay and lesbian parents and to resolve the
constitutional predicament Pulliam created. In fact, Pulliam
illustrates why the divide within the law, not merely the procedure, in
gay and lesbian custody cases must be resolved. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina in Pulliam misread the facts of the case and
explained that it did not "hold that the mere homosexual status of a
parent is sufficient, taken alone, to support denying such parent
custody of his or her child or children. That question is not presented
by the facts of this case." '272 Indeed, that question was the exact issue
When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for the
modification of an existing child custody order, the appellate courts must examine
the trial court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by
substantial evidence .... [T]he evidence must demonstrate a connection between
the substantial change in circumstances and the welfare of the child, and flowing
from that prerequisite is the requirement that the trial court make findings of fact
regarding that connection.
REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.108; see also Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d
1, 5 (1975); Johnson v. Adolf, 149 N.C. App. 876, 878, 561 S.E.2d 588, 589 (2002) (noting
that findings of fact are required to support the court's determination that modification is
in best interest of the child and this determination must be made explicitly); Benedict v.
Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 377, 451 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1994); Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App.
351, 354, 399 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1991) ("The trial court [has a] duty to make findings of fact
supported by competent evidence that demonstrate a showing of changed
circumstances.").
270. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 481, 586 S.E.2d at 257.
271. See supra Part I.D.
272. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 623, 627,501 S.E.2d 898, 902, 904 (1998).
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before the court, and the court addressed the issue incorrectly. As
analyzed above, the only evidence of harm presented was that one
son cried when told his father was gay, and that alone was insufficient
to change custody. 3 Sexual activity was not a relevant issue in the
case; no evidence existed that the children were exposed to
inappropriate sexual language or sexual acts, nor was there any
indication of sexual abuse. The issue was Fred Smith's sexual
orientation-that is what caused Carol Pulliam to bring the custody
suit,274 that is what formed the basis of the trial court's and state
supreme court's analyses,275 and that is why Fred Smith ultimately lost
custody of his two sons. Thus, Pulliam v. Smith must be overruled to
return North Carolina courts to a true nexus test.
More than overruling Pulliam is required, however, to prevent
future misapplication of the nexus test. To correct the divide within
the law, upon overruling Pulliam, the court should define harm to
prevent future misapplication of the nexus test and declare that the
sexual orientation of a parent is not a legitimate consideration in the
"best interest of the child" analysis. 276  When determining if
modification is in the child's best interest, it is the trial court's
responsibility to choose the "environment, which will ... best
encourage full development of the child's physical, mental, emotional,
moral and spiritual faculties. '277 The court "must make a comparison
between the two applicants considering all factors that indicate which
of the two is 'best-fitted to give the child the home-life, care, and
supervision that will be most conducive to its well-being.' "278
Relevant factors in this analysis include "the wishes of the child, the
character and personality traits of the parents, and the conduct of the
parents., 279  Additionally, the need for stability in crafting custody
273. See discussion supra Part I.D.
274. Pulliam v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 144, 146, 476 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1996), rev'd, 348
N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
275. See supra Parts L.A and I.D.
276. This breaks with the traditional wording of the nexus test which requires courts to
find that the parent's homosexuality has an effect on the child before it may be considered.
See supra text accompanying note 53. The traditional approach allows sexual orientation
itself to be considered. This Comment distinguishes between sexual orientation and
sexual activity and argues that sexual orientation itself should never be a factor, but that
sexual activity may be a factor under the nexus test.
277. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 375-76, 451 S.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1994)
(quoting In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 645, 290 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1982)); see also Blackley v.
Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974).
278. Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 142, 530 S.E.2d 576, 580 (2000) (quoting
Griffith v. Griffith, 240 N.C. 271, 275, 81 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1954)).
279. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.7c (noting that the focus should be on "the
strength of the relationship" between child and parents, and explaining that, while the
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orders should be considered.28 ° Sexual orientation is not one of these
relevant factors.
In custody decisions, courts must distinguish between sexual
orientation, which may not be a factor, and sexual activity, which may
be a factor. This means that harm will be based not on a court's
moral opinion but on research grounded in social science. This
research "indicate[s] that a child is not harmed by the mere fact that
the child's parent is gay or lesbian, or that the parent associates with
other homosexuals, or that the parent is open and honest about his or
her sexuality."28' Rather, studies suggest the "best interest of the
child" may include that:
1. a child be aware of her [parent's] sexual identity early;
2. the [parent] be open and comfortable with [his or] her
sexual identity;
3. the child be a part of [a lesbian or gay] community and
know other children of lesbians [or gays];
4. the child be able to talk to peers, family members, and
outsiders about the [parent's] sexual identity; and
5. if the [parent] is living with or committed to a long-term
partner, the couple model healthy nonsexual intimacy and
affection, to ensure the child's sense of security and well-
being.
Ultimately, courts need to define harm under the nexus
standard to prevent its being used to deny a lesbian or gay
parent custody of a child based on behavior that is, in fact, in
the best interests of the child.282
Numerous counter-arguments exist to this definition of harm.
One such argument is that a home with one father and one mother is
the optimal environment for child rearing. However, even the
Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he demographic changes of
environment the child lives in with the parent is relevant, it is "generally not as
important"); see also In Re Custody of Williamson, 32 N.C. App. 616, 620-21, 233 S.E.2d
677, 680-81 (1977) (Finding that although not controlling, the wishes of a child who has
reached the age of discretion are entitled to consideration in awarding custody "because
the consideration of such wishes will aid the court in making a custodial decree which is
for the best interests and welfare of the child." (quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App.
626, 631,184 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1971))).
280. See Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975) ("As a general rule in
this State, parents have the natural and legal right to the custody, companionship, control,
and bringing up of their infant children, and this right may not lightly be denied or
interfered with by action of the courts.").
281. Huff, supra note 38, at 695, 714.
282. Id. at 715.
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the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American
family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to
household. '283 It has also been argued that, at minimum, more study
is necessary before any conclusion can be drawn about the effect of a
parent's homosexuality on children. 284 This position, based on alleged
insufficient study, is an inadequate justification to change custody
because it means the nexus test's requirement of effect on the child
has not been shown. Until effect is shown, custody should not be
modified.285
The definition of harm advocated here does not comprise the
stigma generally associated with homosexuality. Indeed, stigma is an
improper consideration because the Supreme Court of the United
States held in Palmore v. Sidodt86 that
the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might
inflict are [not] permissible considerations for removal of an
infant child from the custody of its natural mother .... The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.
287
Although the Court in Palmore used strict scrutiny because it found a
race-based classification, "it did not condemn only racial biases, but
more generally 'private' ones of presumably wide variety. '288
Furthermore, "Palmore's actual holding-that wishing to shield a
child from bigotry aimed at a parent is no reason to deny custody to
283. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
284. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 980 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
Even in the absence of bias or political agenda behind the various studies of
children raised by same-sex couples, the most neutral and strict application of
scientific principles to this field would be constrained by the limited period of
observation that has been available. Gay and lesbian couples living together
openly, and official recognition of them as their children's sole parents,
compromise a very recent phenomenon.
Id.
285. See In re Adoption of Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 553-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1993) (recognizing that even though studies have been limited, the "development of
gender identity, of gender role behavior, and sexual preference among offspring of gay
and lesbian parents was found in every study to fall within normal bounds" (quoting
Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1031-
32 (1992))).
286. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
287. Id. at 433.
288. Larsen, supra note 97, at 86.
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that parent-is entirely applicable to cases where the parent is a
member of other stigmatized groups. '  For example, a Florida
district court of appeal found that "community beliefs and possible
reactions" against the parent's homosexuality could not be considered
as having effect on the child under Palmore.29° The court recognized
the stigma comes from the fact that the parent is a homosexual, not
that the child lives with the parent. 91 Regardless of the court's
custody decision, the child will still have a parent who is homosexual.
Therefore, stigma is not a valid concern under the nexus test
advocated here.
B. One Standard for All Parents: Focusing on Sexual Activity When
Appropriate and Not Sexual Orientation
After explicitly defining harm so that sexual orientation is not a
consideration in the "best interest of the child" analysis, it should be
made clear that sexual activity may still be a relevant factor. The
same conduct that harms children of heterosexual parents will harm
children of homosexual parents. This means that the sexual activity
of all parents should be held to the same standard. One meaningful
part of such standard is that "[d]irect exposure to a parent's intimate
conduct may be detrimental to the child's well-being. Thus,
consideration of the [sexual activity] to which the child has been
directly exposed may be appropriate under the nexus test." '292 Courts
are required to "discriminate between intimate sexual [activity],
exposure to which might harm a child, and gestures of affection,
exposure to which may contribute to a child's understanding of
human relationships and thus to the child's well-being." '293 Courts
must therefore focus on the conduct involved and not the sexual
identity of the parent. The main rule can be summarized as follows:
"Conduct which would be inappropriate for a married heterosexual
couple is also inappropriate for a lesbian or gay couple. Conversely,
conduct in which a married heterosexual couple may engage in front
289. Id. at 86-87.
290. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also In re
Adoption of Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 552 ("[I]f there is ever any harassment or
community disapproval, this court should have no role in supporting or tacitly approving
such behavior.").
291. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d at 413; see also Gill, supra note 134, at 373 ("Notwithstanding
evidence of stigma, courts should still acknowledge that regardless of the custody order,
the gay parent is still gay. If the child's peers are going to tease because the parent is gay,
removing the child from custody will not rectify the problem.").
292. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 666.
293. Id.
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of their children should also be appropriate for a lesbian or gay
couple. ,
29 4
Consequently, to purge the double standard that exists for gay
and lesbian parents and to meet the constitutional touchstone set out
in Lawrence, sexual orientation should not be a consideration in
determining "harm" under the nexus test. To this end, Pulliam must
be overruled to return North Carolina to the nexus test which
requires specific evidence of harm to the child from the sexual activity
of the parent and to make clear that this single standard exists for all
parents. Adherence to a true nexus test means that courts will not
consider collateral issues such as a parent's sexual orientation but
instead will focus on the best interest of the child.
CONCLUSION
In Pulliam v. Smith, Fred Smith lost custody of the two sons he
raised from birth because of his sexual orientation. Currently, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina claims to employ a nexus test
requiring "evidence directly linking the change [of circumstances] to
the welfare of the child[ren]. ', 295  The Pulliam court's approach,
however, did not match its rhetoric. Instead, it removed custody from
Fred Smith without finding sufficient evidence of any effect on the
children, thus applying the presumption of harm standard.296 Under
the presumption of harm standard, courts may "presume without
evidence that a homosexual parent's conduct adversely affects the
child. ,
297
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's endorsement of the
presumption of harm standard was a step backward and was
problematic from the beginning. The presumption of harm standard
denies custody to many gay and lesbian parents who are excellent
caregivers, even when such parents exhibit superior parenting skills as
compared to the heterosexual parents involved in the custody dispute.
Because courts are allowed to delve into the collateral issue of a
parent's sexual orientation instead of focusing on the best interest of
the child, courts often do not correctly compare the two parents on a
range of factors, including "the wishes of the child, the character and
294. Id. ("[U]niform standards would do much to improve the position of children of
lesbian and gay parents as well as the parents themselves, for the conduct at issue in most
cases is conduct which is readily seen as innocuous if engaged in by a heterosexual
couple.").
295. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471,478, 586 S.E.2d 250, 255-56 (2003).
296. See supra Part I.D.
297. Huff, supra note 38, at 700 (emphasis added).
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personality traits of the parents, ... the conduct of the parents, 298
and the need for stability.299 In Pulliam, the court failed to consider
the wishes of the children and also failed to adequately analyze the
character and personalities of the parents.
Furthermore, Pulliam erroneously set precedent disadvantaging
gay and lesbian parents by finding that Fred Smith's sexual activity
while the children were in the home supported a change of custody.3°°
In 2000, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held in Browning v.
Helff that the children's presence in the home where one parent was
residing with a person of the opposite sex in a nonmarital relationship
did not have effect on them.
For Pulliam to be in harmony with Browning and the nexus
requirement, one cannot assert that Fred Smith's private sexual
activity in the home affected the two boys simply because the children
were also in the home. Thus, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
discriminated against Fred Smith because he engaged in sexual
conduct with another man. Pulliam created a double standard for
consideration of sexual activity, subjecting homosexual parents to a
higher degree of scrutiny than heterosexual parents-a level of
scrutiny that the parents may never be able to meet under the
presumption of harm standard if courts can presume harm when none
exists.
This higher scrutiny under Pulliam's presumption of harm
approach denies gay and lesbian parents the freedom to be their
authentic selves. If they are honest about their own sexual
orientation with their own children, kiss their partner on the cheek in
front of their child, or live with their partner, gay and lesbian parents
risk losing custody of their children. Even if gay and lesbian parents
manage to win custody, it often comes at the price of sacrificing their
ability to show affection to their life partner or to live with that
person. The courts have made it clear that gay and lesbian parents
must choose between their children and their partners. Yet,
heterosexual parents are not forced to make this choice.
In the last ten years, it has become even clearer that Pulliam's
reasoning is fatally flawed. While Pulliam resulted in a move away
from the nexus requirement, courts across the country have moved in
the opposite direction."' The courts' focus on homosexuality
298. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 13.7c.
299. Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
300. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 626-27, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1998).
301. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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divorced from any effect on the children and the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. Texas likely make
Pulliam's presumption of harm standard constitutionally suspect.3°z
Grounded in an expansive concept of liberty,3"3 the Lawrence Court
"broadly announced a substantive due process right of adult sexual
intimacy for all Americans."" Lawrence "stands for the proposition
that gay couples, 'whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law,' have the right to develop and maintain personal relationships
without state intrusion or penalty. Gay parents should therefore not
have to choose between their partners and their children."3 5 The
Court's caution against the use of morality to disadvantage gays and
lesbians30 6 likely dealt a fatal blow to Pulliam. The Pulliam court
sanctioned a change of custody based on the court's own moral view
about homosexuality rather than its effect on the children. It defied
the commands set out in Lawrence that the existence of homosexuals
should not be "demeaned" and that morality alone is insufficient to
justify discrimination against gays and lesbians.3 7
To meet Lawrence's constitutional command and to correct the
disparate standards in North Carolina between heterosexual parents
and homosexual parents, Pulliam v. Smith should be overruled. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina should adopt one standard for all
parents when considering their sexual activity in modification-of-
custody cases: a true nexus test requiring evidence of effect on the
child. To prevent misapplication of this nexus test, appellate courts
must prevent inappropriate speculation about future harm.
Appellate courts should require the trial courts to make specific
findings of fact supported by substantial evidence that there has been
a substantial change of circumstances, that this change has effect on
the child, and that modification of the custody order is in the child's
best interest. This will "constrain freewheeling judicial discretion and
focus the court's inquiry narrowly on the facts and issues relevant to
302. "Given cases like Lawrence and Romer, can denying custody to a fit gay parent
whose sexuality has caused no harm to the child be anything other than a 'status-based
enactment divorced from any factual context' that 'demeans the lives of homosexual
persons?' " Larsen, supra note 97, at 79 (citations omitted).
303. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); see also Larsen, supra note 97, at
58 (noting that the Lawrence Court examined the rights of a "person," not "gay person,"
to find a substantive due process right to sexual privacy).
304. Larsen, supra note 97, at 57.
305. Id. at 94.
306. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559.
307. Id. at 559, 578.
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the well-being of the child."3 °8 For the nexus test to be effective in
guiding courts towards the best interest of the children, the fatal
defect in the law when gay and lesbian parents are concerned must be
corrected. The Supreme Court of North Carolina should define harm
so that sexual orientation is not a legitimate factor in the "best
interest of the child" analysis. Courts must distinguish between
sexual orientation, which is not a relevant factor, and sexual activity,
which may be a relevant factor. This will place all parents, gay and
straight, on the same level. The same sexual activity harmful to the
children of heterosexual parents will be harmful to the children of
homosexual parents. The focus of the courts will thus be shifted to
determining what is in the best interest of the children rather than the
sexual orientation of the parents.
Ultimately, courts must not be swayed by prejudice nor
concentrate unduly on the parents. Instead, courts should do what is
best for North Carolina's children by remaining faithful to the long-
held principle that "the welfare of the infants themselves is the polar
star by which the discretion of the courts is to be guided.""3 9 As one
court recognized fifteen years ago:
[F]amilies differ in both size and shape within and among the
many cultural and socio-economic layers that make up this
society. We cannot continue to pretend that there is one
formula, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in
order to achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe
children should inhabit.310
With society's ever-growing diversity and increasing inclusion of gay
and lesbian citizens, Pulliam v. Smith is out of step with social and
legal norms and must be overruled.
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